INVESTIGACION

FOIS & COAS

Based on the comprehensive investigation detailed in the provided documents, our findings of infringement that form the basis for subsequent legal claims are numerous and severe. A primary finding is that Air Europa was likely ineligible for the rescue funds from its inception, as there are significant doubts and contradictory reports about whether it was already an “empresa en crisis” before the crucial cut-off date of December 31, 2019. The administrative process itself was deeply flawed, marked by an unusual celerity that saw the largest and first-ever FASEE rescue approved in approximately 70 days, a fraction of the time taken for other cases, which suggests a severe lack of rigorous analysis and due diligence. This procedural failure is compounded by a finding of systematic opacity, where the government and its agencies have repeatedly refused to provide key documents to parliamentary and public scrutiny. Critically, we have identified a major breach of the rules of governance in the potential conflict of interest affecting the President of the Government, who appears to have failed in his legal duty to abstain from the approving vote despite his wife’s documented business meetings and professional links with the beneficiary’s parent company, Globalia, during the negotiation period. Furthermore, our investigation points towards criminal conduct, with strong indications from UCO reports of a plot involving the former Minister of Transport, his advisor, and an intermediary to exert undue influence and facilitate the rescue, allegedly in exchange for personal kickbacks. Finally, we find that the aid itself may have been granted with a deviant purpose, not to protect the public interest but to facilitate the private acquisition of Air Europa by IAG on more favorable terms, representing a misuse of public funds.

These findings give rise to several powerful and interconnected causes of action against both the public and private entities involved. The principal cause of action is a claim for State Liability, known in Spanish law as

responsabilidad patrimonial, arising from the “abnormal functioning of public services”. This claim is substantiated by the numerous identified irregularities, including the potential granting of aid to an ineligible company and the flawed administrative process. A related cause of action is that the bailout constitutes illegal State Aid under the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, which could lead to a recovery order for the full amount of the aid plus interest if it is found to have distorted competition unlawfully. We can also seek to have the administrative act granting the aid declared null and void, on the grounds that the decision-making process was fatally flawed, particularly by the President of the Government’s failure to abstain from the vote, which vitiates the consent of the State. Beyond the State, there are potential tortious claims against private parties, including a claim against Air Europa and Globalia for inducing the aid contract through deceit if they misrepresented their financial state, and against IAG for tortious interference in public administration. Finally, the evidence supports pursuing criminal complaints for offenses such as influence peddling, prevarication, malversation of public funds, and bribery against the individuals involved. A conviction on such charges would provide irrefutable proof of the administration’s abnormal functioning and would cement the State’s liability.

This memorandum provides an analysis of new intelligence assets and their profound implications for our strategic prosecution of the Air Europa case. The attached documents arm us with the precise operational tools, legal standards, empirical validation, and commercial exit strategies necessary to advance our objectives. Our position has been significantly strengthened; we now possess a clear roadmap to not only build an irrefutable case but also to monetise it pre-litigation.

Analysis of New Intelligence Assets

1. The COCOO CaseLink Doctrine (SEARCHLINK Model.pdf)

This internal document is our operational playbook¹. I have extracted its core function: it translates our strategic objectives into concrete, repeatable intelligence-gathering protocols using a specified toolkit of platforms²²²². For the Air Europa case, this provides a direct, step-by-step guide for evidence acquisition. We will use OpenCorporates and Registradores de España to conduct a full corporate network mapping of Globalia and any entities linked to key persons of interest, operationalising our “Stealth Consolidation” analysis^{3333333333333333}. We will interrogate the LSE News Explorer for IAG’s regulatory announcements to track their statements on the acquisition, and use CURIA to find precedent and procedural weaknesses in similar airline state aid cases validated by the EU Commission^444444444. The playbook’s protocols instruct us on how to use these tools to find the specific director names, SIC codes, and prior litigation history required to build our evidence dossier^555555555. The doctrine’s emphasis on identifying an “Enforcement Gap” by comparing regulatory data from sources like Violation Tracker UK with official government reports from GOV.UK is directly applicable⁶⁶⁶⁶. We can use this protocol to demonstrate a systemic failure by Spanish authorities, elevating our complaint to a matter of significant public interest and creating the “Snowball Effect” that positions us to mediate the resulting crisis^777777777. In essence, this document provides the granular ‘how-to’ for every piece of evidence we need to find.

2. Academic Validation of Undisclosed Mergers (MA DISCLOSURES.pdf)

This working paper provides powerful, independent academic validation for the central theory of our case. I have extracted its core finding: mandatory investor disclosures, such as the SEC’s Item 2 reports, create tangible antitrust risk that deters horizontal mergers^888888888. The paper’s regression discontinuity analysis, which exploits the 10% of acquirer’s assets disclosure threshold, is a direct parallel to the situation we are investigating and proves our premise is not theoretical but an empirically observed reality⁹⁹⁹⁹. Critically, the paper presents a methodology for measuring the value of undisclosed mergers by reconciling aggregated cash flow statements with transaction-level data^{10101010101010101010101010101010}. Its finding that such deals amounted to over $2.3 trillion in the US between 2002-2016, or 77% of all transactions by number, is staggering^{111111111111111111}. The document is invaluable as it allows us to argue that the Spanish authorities were, or should have been, aware of this deterrence effect. It gives us a blueprint to conduct our own analysis of Spanish public companies to quantify the likely scale of “stealth consolidation” in the local aviation market. It further substantiates our claim that the most anticompetitive mergers are the ones most likely to be hidden, meaning any analysis based only on disclosed deals understates the true harm to competition^12121212.

3. Global Standards for Beneficial Ownership (Spanish Guidance-Beneficial-Ownership-Legal-Persons.pdf)

This document, the official Spanish translation of the FATF guidance, is the international rulebook we will use to hold the Spanish authorities to account. I have extracted the precise definitions and standards that are foundational to our case. The guidance defines a “beneficial owner” as the natural person who

ultimately owns or controls a legal person, whether through direct ownership or other means, including informal control^13131313. This is critical, as it requires disclosure beyond legal ownership and corporate structures^14141414. The document mandates a “multi-pronged approach” to transparency, meaning we can attack the entire system if the company-level data, the central registry, and supplementary sources are collectively deficient^15151515. It specifies that information must be adequate, accurate, and, crucially, verified^{161616161616161616}. The guidance on nominee arrangements is particularly salient; it requires that the status of nominee shareholders and directors be disclosed to the relevant authorities, and that the identity of the nominator they act for be recorded^{171717171717171717}. It clarifies that a nominee is never the beneficial owner^18181818. This FATF guidance provides the authoritative standard to demand full transparency of Globalia’s ultimate ownership and to challenge the legality of any undisclosed nominee arrangements that may have been used to obscure control.

4. The Case for Public Beneficial Ownership Registers (TI_ BORs.pdf)

This Transparency International report provides the public interest and policy context for our campaign. My key extraction from this document is the evidence that public beneficial ownership registers (BORs) are a recognised global standard for fighting corruption and that their implementation across the EU has been fraught with delay and obstruction^19191919. The report details how the 5th AMLD mandated public BORs for companies by January 2020, a deadline that most member states failed to meet^20202020. It also highlights common shortcomings, such as paywalls and restrictive search functions, giving us a checklist of potential flaws to assess in Spain’s implementation²¹. The document is vital for our communications strategy, as it provides compelling case studies where BORs helped uncover high-level corruption and conflicts of interest^22222222. These examples, such as the Ukrainian businessman arrested in France and the case against the Czech Prime Minister, allow us to frame our investigation not as a niche legal challenge, but as part of a global movement for transparency and accountability that produces tangible results^23232323. This report helps us build the moral and political pressure that is essential to our mediation strategy.

5. The Litigation Marketplace (HOW 2 SELL MY LITIGATION, USP AND MEDIATION PROJECTS.txt)

This report is our key to monetising the Air Europa project and represents a direct path to funding our operations or achieving our objectives without incurring the full cost and risk of litigation. I have extracted a targeted list of firms that engage in the outright purchase of legal claims, a practice distinct from simple litigation funding^24242424. The key players identified are Fortress Investment Group, Harbour Litigation Funding, and Certum Group, among others^25252525. The report provides their contact information and confirms their appetite for acquiring judgments, arbitration awards, and even pre-litigation opportunities^{26262626262626262626262626262626}. It clarifies that while the purchase of an abstract “strategy” is not standard, firms do invest in the pre-litigation phase by funding investigations or acquiring the underlying assets whose value depends on future litigation^{272727272727272727}. This document is therefore our roadmap for assigning or selling the case. Our strategy will be to use the intelligence gathered via our CaseLink Doctrine to compile a comprehensive evidence dossier. We will then approach the firms listed in this report with an Unsolicited Proposal to acquire the portfolio of claims we are assembling on behalf of affected airlines and businesses. This provides us with a clear, actionable strategy to secure an upfront monetisation of our work, thereby transferring the risk and cost of formal litigation to a specialised financial entity