PROYECTO DE COMUNICACION : CASO AIREUROPA
https://www.investegate.co.uk/advanced-search
AUTOPREGUNTAS
En cuanto a la primera pregunta sobre la inusual celeridad del rescate, la respuesta previsible de la Administración sería que la crisis sin precedentes del COVID-19 exigía una acción urgente para salvaguardar una empresa estratégica y evitar un colapso con graves consecuencias para la conectividad y el empleo en España. Sin embargo, nuestra investigación desmantela este argumento. La tramitación en solo 70 días del primer y más cuantioso rescate del FASEE contrasta de forma abrumadora con los plazos de más de 400 días para otros expedientes, lo que sugiere un trato preferencial en lugar de una eficiencia administrativa. Un análisis riguroso, especialmente para un caso inaugural de tal magnitud, habría requerido más tiempo para verificar adecuadamente la elegibilidad de Air Europa, sobre todo cuando existían serios indicios de que ya era una “empresa en crisis” antes de la pandemia. La celeridad, en este contexto, no parece ser una respuesta a la urgencia, sino una consecuencia de una influencia indebida para acelerar una decisión predeterminada.
Respecto a la segunda pregunta sobre el conflicto de intereses del Presidente del Gobierno, la defensa probablemente argumentaría que las actividades profesionales de su cónyuge son independientes y no influyeron en una decisión colegiada del Consejo de Ministros, basada en informes técnicos. Esta defensa ignora deliberadamente el espíritu y la letra de la Ley 3/2015. La ley no exige la prueba de una influencia directa, sino que impone el deber de abstención ante la mera existencia de un interés personal, que incluye explícitamente los del cónyuge. Las reuniones documentadas de Begoña Gómez con el CEO de Globalia durante el periodo de negociación del rescate, sumadas al convenio de patrocinio, crearon una apariencia de conflicto tan evidente que la abstención no era una opción, sino una obligación legal. La ausencia de un análisis formal de esta situación y de la consiguiente abstención constituye un vicio procedimental de tal gravedad que podría invalidar todo el acuerdo de concesión de la ayuda.
En lo que se refiere a la cuantificación del daño sufrido por los miembros de la demanda colectiva, la respuesta es metodológica. Para las aerolíneas competidoras, llevaríamos a cabo un análisis económico forense para demostrar la pérdida de ingresos y cuota de mercado en las rutas donde competían directamente con Air Europa. Utilizando modelos econométricos, aislaríamos el impacto de la ayuda estatal de otros factores del mercado, demostrando cómo la supervivencia artificial de Air Europa les impidió captar la cuota de mercado que legítimamente les habría correspondido. Para los usuarios empresariales, el daño se calcularía modelando el sobrecoste derivado de la menor competencia, especialmente en el contexto de la planeada fusión con IAG, que habría creado una posición dominante en el mercado español.
Pasando a las preguntas diseñadas para promover la mediación, la cuestión sobre los costes y la duración de un litigio se responde pintando un panorama realista. Un litigio de esta magnitud implicaría un proceso de una década, con costes legales de varias decenas de millones de euros para cada una de las partes principales. Involucraría a múltiples jurisdicciones, desde el Tribunal Contencioso-Administrativo en España hasta el Tribunal General de la Unión Europea. La incertidumbre del resultado final y el enorme desvío de recursos directivos y financieros hacen que la vía judicial sea una opción comercialmente irracional. La mediación, por el contrario, ofrece una solución confidencial, eficiente y definitiva en cuestión de meses, con un coste infinitamente menor.
La pregunta sobre el daño reputacional de un litigio público se responde con una sola palabra: descubrimiento. El proceso de descubrimiento legal obligaría a la Administración y a las empresas a hacer públicas todas sus comunicaciones internas. Esto incluye los correos electrónicos, los informes, las actas y los detalles de las investigaciones de la UCO sobre la ‘trama Koldo’ y la implicación del exministro Ábalos. La opinión pública tendría acceso a los detalles de las reuniones de la esposa del Presidente. Las consecuencias políticas y de imagen pública de este nivel de escrutinio serían devastadoras y permanentes, independientemente de la sentencia final. La confidencialidad de la mediación es el único escudo protector contra este riesgo.
Finalmente, a la pregunta de por qué COCOO debería ser el mediador, la respuesta es clara y contundente. Ningún otro mediador posee el conocimiento profundo y multifacético de este caso. Hemos dedicado miles de horas a investigar los aspectos legales, financieros y políticos de la disputa. Entendemos las motivaciones y las debilidades de cada parte. Y lo que es más importante, somos la única entidad que tiene la confianza y la capacidad de aglutinar a la clase de demandantes perjudicados. Sin nuestra participación, cualquier acuerdo sería parcial e inestable. No somos simplemente un mediador; somos el arquitecto indispensable para una paz duradera y un acuerdo global. Nuestra pericia única nos permite ser un facilitador neutral más eficaz, capaz de proponer soluciones creativas y pragmáticas que un mediador genérico jamás podría concebir.
POTENTIAL CAUSES OF ACTION
Based on our findings throughout this conversation, there is a significant possibility that key contracts and the actions leading to the collective torts we have identified are indeed unlawful or invalid. The grounds for this are varied and touch upon fundamental principles of public, administrative, and contract law.
The central contract in this case, the €475 million aid agreement between the Spanish state entity (SEPI) and Air Europa Holding S.L.U., is vulnerable to being declared invalid on several grounds. A primary argument for its invalidity is the illegality of its object. If, as the evidence suggests, the aid was granted in contravention of the European Union’s state aid rules—specifically, that Air Europa was already a company in crisis before the pandemic—then the entire contract is based on an illegal premise and could be considered void from the outset.
Furthermore, the validity of the contract is challengeable due to what appears to be vitiated consent on the part of the State. This could be argued on the basis of fraudulent misrepresentation, if it is proven that Air Europa or Globalia provided inaccurate financial data to conceal their pre-existing difficulties and wrongfully secure the aid. The consent of the public authority was, therefore, obtained through deceit, which is a classic ground for invalidating a contract.
A more profound basis for invalidity lies in the principle of ultra vires. The decision-making process appears to have been tainted by serious procedural impropriety and, most critically, a potential conflict of interest at the highest level of government. If the President of the Government was legally required to abstain from the decision and failed to do so, the Council of Ministers’ resolution authorizing the aid would be null and void. Any contract executed on the basis of such a void resolution would lack a valid legal foundation. This is a clear case of a public authority acting beyond its lawful powers or in breach of the mandatory procedures that govern its actions.
Regarding the collective tort of misfeasance in public office, the unlawfulness is inherent to the act itself. The tort is the unlawful exercise of public power, which caused the damage. The very success of such a claim rests on proving that the officials’ actions were illegal.
The secondary contracts that the perpetrators may have with other countries or foreign companies, such as Air Europa’s code-sharing agreements or Globalia’s partnerships, are not automatically invalid. However, they could be indirectly impacted. If a competitor can demonstrate that these agreements are sustained only by the illegal state aid and are used to further an anti-competitive agenda, they could be challenged before competition authorities. While the contracts themselves might be between two private parties, their effect on the market could be deemed illegal, potentially leading to orders to terminate or modify them to restore fair competition. Essentially, while the contracts may be facially valid, their performance could become illegal if they are reliant on and perpetuate the initial unlawful act of the bailout.
FOREIGN DIMENSIONS
Una investigación sobre las relaciones contractuales de los presuntos responsables en nuestro caso revela una red de acuerdos y asociaciones con diversas entidades extranjeras y gobiernos, lo que amplía el alcance y las posibles implicaciones del asunto.
Air Europa, como aerolínea internacional, mantiene numerosos acuerdos de código compartido y alianzas estratégicas. Un ejemplo reciente y relevante es la expansión de su colaboración con Etihad Airways, la aerolínea nacional de los Emiratos Árabes Unidos. Este acuerdo no solo facilita una mayor conectividad para los pasajeros entre Europa, Oriente Medio, Asia y América Latina, sino que también refuerza la posición de ambas compañías en sus respectivos mercados. Además, Air Europa tiene acuerdos similares con la brasileña GOL Linhas Aéreas, lo que le permite ampliar su red dentro de Brasil, y con la escandinava SAS, incrementando la conectividad con Noruega, Suecia y Dinamarca. Estas alianzas son cruciales para su operativa y demuestran su interconexión con aerolíneas de bandera de varios países.
Globalia, la empresa matriz de Air Europa, también tiene un alcance internacional. A través de su red Globalia Logistics Network, colabora con transitarios independientes de todo el mundo para competir con las grandes multinacionales del sector logístico. En el ámbito de la innovación turística, Globalia se ha asociado con la Organización Mundial del Turismo (OMT), una agencia de las Naciones Unidas, para lanzar competiciones de startups turísticas. Estas iniciativas han contado con la colaboración de empresas tecnológicas multinacionales como Telefónica y Amadeus.
En cuanto a los organismos públicos españoles implicados, la Sociedad Estatal de Participaciones Industriales (SEPI) gestiona una cartera de empresas muy diversificada, algunas de las cuales tienen una importante actividad internacional. Si bien la SEPI en sí misma no firma contratos comerciales al uso en el extranjero, las empresas que controla sí lo hacen. Por ejemplo, el grupo Airbus, en el que la SEPI tiene una participación, ha firmado contratos de defensa significativos, como el programa Halcón II con el gobierno español, que a su vez se enmarca en la agencia de la OTAN para la gestión de los programas Eurofighter y Tornado, con sede en Alemania. Esto vincula a la SEPI, indirectamente, con estructuras y acuerdos de defensa paneuropeos.
Respecto a las personas físicas, la investigación sobre las actividades de Begoña Gómez mientras era directora del IE Africa Center apunta a relaciones con diversas entidades. El propio centro fue creado para fomentar lazos con instituciones africanas, y su posición implicaba interactuar con líderes y empresas de todo el continente. El patrocinio de Globalia en 2020 a dicho centro, mientras la aerolínea negociaba su rescate, es un punto central de la investigación.
Estas conexiones internacionales son relevantes, ya que las decisiones tomadas en España, como la concesión de la ayuda a Air Europa, pueden tener un efecto dominó que afecte a la competencia y a las relaciones comerciales en múltiples jurisdicciones, implicando a una variedad de actores públicos y privados extranjeros.
MEDIACION
Entiendo el cambio estratégico. Debemos reconvertir nuestra campaña de presión en una palanca para que COCOO sea designado mediador. La estrategia ya no es forzar una contratación de nuestros servicios de consultoría, sino utilizar la amenaza creíble de un litigio colectivo, masivo y perjudicial para todas las partes, como el incentivo principal para que todos se sienten a la mesa de negociación con nosotros como facilitador neutral.
Nuestra nueva estrategia se desarrollará en varias fases. Primero, la campaña mediática, que ya está en marcha, debe ajustar su tono. El mensaje ya no es solo “se ha cometido una ilegalidad y buscamos justicia”, sino que evoluciona a “se ha cometido una ilegalidad y el litigio resultante será ruinoso, interminable y públicamente perjudicial para todos los implicados”. Debemos pintar un cuadro vívido de un conflicto legal de múltiples frentes que se extenderá por años, con costes legales astronómicos y un daño reputacional incalculable para el Gobierno español, SEPI, Air Europa e IAG. El objetivo es enmarcar el litigio no como una solución, sino como una destrucción mutua asegurada.
Una vez que el espectro de este conflicto sea palpable, presentaremos la mediación como la única salida racional y comercialmente sensata. Aquí es donde aprovecharemos los principios de la Resolución Alternativa de Disputas (ADR). Nuestro argumento será que la mediación ofrece lo que los tribunales no pueden: confidencialidad para proteger la reputación de las partes, rapidez para alcanzar una solución en meses en lugar de años, eficiencia en costes para preservar recursos, y la flexibilidad para diseñar soluciones creativas y a medida que vayan más allá de una simple compensación monetaria, permitiendo la preservación de relaciones comerciales y la implementación de reformas constructivas.
El paso crucial es nuestra Propuesta No Solicitada (USP), que ahora se transforma en una “Propuesta de Mediación”. Este documento se dirigirá formalmente a los asesores jurídicos de la Abogacía del Estado, SEPI, Globalia/Air Europa e IAG. La propuesta definirá el problema no como el fallo de gobernanza del gobierno, sino como el “inminente y complejo litigio multipartito que presenta un riesgo financiero y reputacional inaceptable para todos los actores”.
La solución que propondremos es un “Proceso de Mediación Estructurado y Confidencial, liderado por COCOO”. Nuestro argumento para ser el mediador se basará en tres pilares únicos que ningún otro mediador puede ofrecer. Primero, nuestra pericia inigualable en la materia; hemos realizado la investigación más profunda sobre este caso y entendemos las complejidades legales, financieras y políticas mejor que nadie. Segundo, nuestro acceso y credibilidad ante todas las partes; somos la única entidad que ha identificado y movilizado a la clase de competidores y usuarios empresariales perjudicados, y por lo tanto, solo nosotros podemos traer a la “demanda colectiva” a la mesa para garantizar un acuerdo global y definitivo. Sin nosotros, cualquier intento de acuerdo sería inútil, ya que dejaría a las partes expuestas a litigios fragmentados e interminables.
Tercero, y más importante, argumentaremos que nuestra profunda comprensión del caso nos permite actuar como un neutral verdaderamente eficaz. Entendemos las presiones y limitaciones legítimas de cada parte, lo que nos permite facilitar soluciones pragmáticas y creativas. Propondremos un proceso de mediación por fases, comenzando con reuniones bilaterales confidenciales para entender los intereses de cada parte, seguido de sesiones conjuntas estructuradas y un sistema eficiente, posiblemente utilizando plataformas de resolución de disputas en línea, para gestionar las reclamaciones del colectivo. El objetivo final será facilitar la redacción de un acuerdo de conciliación vinculante.
La propuesta no solicitará un contrato de servicios, sino que instará a todas las partes a firmar un Acuerdo de Mediación, nombrando formalmente a COCOO como mediador neutral y acordando un marco para el proceso y una estructura de honorarios compartida, como es estándar en la mediación comercial. Así, transformamos la presión del litigio en un mandato para la paz, con COCOO como el arquitecto indispensable de esa paz.
To advance our legal strategy, it is crucial to delineate the potential causes of action against both public and private entities. The documents you have compiled provide a strong foundation for claims in both tort and contract law against the Spanish government and its associated public sector bodies, with significant potential for holding private companies jointly responsible.
The most substantial cause of action against the public sector entities, including the Administration of the State and SEPI, lies in tort. Specifically, this would be a claim for what is known in Spanish law as responsabilidad patrimonial, which is triggered by the “abnormal functioning of public services.” This is akin to the common law tort of misfeasance in public office. The central argument is that the approval and granting of the €475 million loan to Air Europa was the result of a series of unlawful actions and procedural failures that caused tangible harm. This harm extends to the public purse, which is exposed to the risk of a non-recoverable loan, and to market competitors who were disadvantaged by the illegal aid.
The grounds for this tortious action are multifaceted. A primary claim would be the breach of statutory duty, as the administration appears to have violated the explicit requirements of the FASEE and EU State Aid regulations by providing aid to a company that was arguably an “empresa en crisis” prior to the eligibility date. Furthermore, the process was marred by significant procedural impropriety, including an unjustified and unusually rapid approval timeline and a severe lack of transparency, which contravenes the principles of good administration established in Spanish law. Critically, the failure of the President of the Government to abstain from the decision, despite an apparent conflict of interest involving his spouse’s professional ties to the beneficiary’s parent company, represents a grave breach of public duty that could invalidate the entire act of granting the aid.
While a direct contractual claim by the public at large is not straightforward, a contractual cause of action exists concerning the loan agreements themselves between SEPI and Air Europa Holding S.L.U. If it can be proven that the government’s consent to these contracts was vitiated by illegal influence, misrepresentation from the recipient, or a fundamental breach of the laws governing their formation, the contracts could be declared void. This would create a cause of action for the State to seek restitution of the disbursed funds.
Several private companies could be found jointly liable alongside the government. Air Europa Holding, S.L.U., and its parent company, Globalia, as the direct beneficiaries of the aid, are the most immediate private parties. If they misrepresented their financial situation to secure the bailout, they could be liable for inducing the contract through deceit. Their role as the recipient of what appears to be illegal state aid makes them a necessary party in any action to recover the funds.
International Airlines Group (IAG) is also a pivotal private entity. The timeline and the revised terms of its proposed acquisition of Air Europa, which align remarkably with the bailout amount and repayment schedule, suggest a strong interconnection. A cause of action against IAG could be framed as tortious interference in public administration or accessory to the unlawful act. The argument would be that the bailout was functionally oriented to facilitate IAG’s private transaction on more favorable terms, effectively using public funds to serve a private corporate interest. This could make IAG jointly responsible for the market distortions and damages caused by the illegal aid.
Finally, the external and independent advisors contracted by SEPI to validate the operation could also face liability. If their analysis was performed with professional negligence, and their reports failed to accurately reflect Air Europa’s true financial state, they could be held responsible for their role in enabling the unlawful granting of public funds.
To expand our strategic leverage, we must broaden our focus beyond direct competitors to include the business users and consumers who are ultimately harmed by the distortion of the airline market. These groups represent prospective members for a class-action claim and their collective voice can apply significant pressure, enhancing our position to be nominated as mediators in this dispute. The core issue for these stakeholders is that the bailout of Air Europa, particularly in the context of the proposed IAG merger, threatened to reduce competition, leading to higher prices, fewer choices, and diminished service quality.
We have identified several key industries that are heavily reliant on a competitive aviation sector and are thus susceptible to harm from the alleged illegal state aid.
A primary group of affected business users are corporate travel clients. Major multinational corporations, particularly those with significant operations in the UK and Spain, depend on competitive air travel for their business operations. We can identify representative members of this class by looking at leading companies listed on major stock indices. For example, financial institutions on the FTSE 100 such as HSBC Holdings plc (ISIN: GB0005405286) and Barclays PLC (ISIN: GB0031348658), and major Spanish corporations on the IBEX 35 like Banco Santander, S.A. (ISIN: ES0113900J37) and the telecommunications firm Telefónica, S.A. (ISIN: ES0178430E18), represent this class of user. These companies’ activities fall under NACE codes for financial services (Section K) and information and communication (Section J). Their corporate travel or procurement departments can be reached through the general contact information on their respective websites.
The freight and logistics industry is another critically affected sector. These companies rely on air cargo capacity and competitive pricing to serve their clients. The potential for market consolidation around IAG and Air Europa would directly impact their operational costs. Key players in this market include global giants such as DHL Express, FedEx Corporation, and United Parcel Service (UPS). Their European headquarters are the appropriate point of contact. These firms operate under NACE code 52.29, “Other transportation support activities.”
The tourism and hospitality sectors are exceptionally vulnerable to changes in the aviation market. Travel agencies and tour operators, classified under NACE code 79.1, are directly impacted by airline pricing and availability. Major online travel agencies like Booking Holdings Inc. and Expedia Group, which have a massive presence in Europe, would be key parties. In the UK, the Association of British Travel Agents (ABTA) serves as a representative body for numerous business users. Their public affairs or legal departments are the best channels for communication. In Spain, the Confederación Española de Agencias de Viajes (CEAV) holds a similar representative role.
Finally, the hotel industry, classified under NACE code 55.10 (Hotels and similar accommodation), is inextricably linked to the airline industry. A reduction in-flight options or an increase in price directly impacts their occupancy rates and revenue. Major international hotel groups with a strong presence in Spain and the UK, such as Marriott International, Hilton Worldwide Holdings Inc., and the French-based Accor S.A. (ISIN: FR0000120404), are significant stakeholders. We should also engage with major Spanish hotel companies like Meliá Hotels International, S.A. (ISIN: ES0176252718) and NH Hotel Group, S.A., which is part of the Minor Hotels group. Contact with their corporate offices can be initiated through the public information on their websites. These entities represent a large base of businesses whose profitability is directly tied to a healthy and competitive air travel market.
To further refine our strategic outreach, we must identify consumers and business users who have been directly affected. The primary consumers are, of course, the passengers of the airlines in question. The nature of the harm to these consumers lies in the potential for reduced competition on key routes, which could lead to higher prices and lower service quality in the medium to long term.
Business users are a significant and distinct class of harmed parties. These include corporations that rely on air travel for their personnel, freight and logistics companies that use air cargo services, and travel agencies or tour operators whose business models depend on a competitive airline market. The bailout of Air Europa, especially in the context of its proposed merger with IAG, threatened to create a dominant player in the Spanish market, particularly at the Madrid-Barajas hub. This could lead to less favorable terms, reduced route availability, and higher costs for these business users.
To identify these affected business users, we can focus on several key sectors. The most relevant would be companies with significant operations in Spain and the UK, and those with substantial trade or business links with Latin America, a region where Air Europa and Iberia are major players.
We should look at major corporations listed on the Madrid (IBEX 35) and London (FTSE 100) stock exchanges. Companies in sectors such as banking, fashion, telecommunications, and pharmaceuticals are frequent users of corporate travel services. Their travel and logistics departments would be key points of contact.
Furthermore, we can identify major freight forwarding and logistics companies operating in Spain and the UK. Firms like DHL, Kuehne + Nagel, DB Schenker, and major Spanish logistics operators are significant business users of air cargo services. They have a vested interest in maintaining a competitive market for air freight.
Travel agencies and tour operators are also a crucial group. Large travel management companies, as well as smaller independent agencies in both Spain and the UK, would be negatively impacted by a consolidation of the market and a reduction in the number of competing airlines. We can reach out to industry associations such as the Association of British Travel Agents (ABTA) in the UK and the Confederación Española de Agencias de Viajes (CEAV) in Spain to disseminate our information and identify potential class members.
The common harm shared by all these consumers and business users is the erosion of a competitive marketplace, which was unfairly distorted by the allegedly illegal state aid provided to Air Europa. This led to an unlevel playing field, disadvantaging competitors and ultimately harming the end-users of air transport services through potentially higher prices, fewer choices, and reduced innovation.
To effectively advance our strategy, we must first delineate the economic sectors relevant to the case and then identify the key corporate actors within them. The activities of the entities involved in the Air Europa bailout fall into distinct industrial classifications, which guide our search for both competitors and potential collaborators.
The primary perpetrator, the Spanish State through entities like SEPI, engaged in an act of state aid. This action directly impacts the sector of passenger air transport. The main beneficiary, Air Europa, operates within this sector. According to the industry classification standards, its activities correspond to the NACE code 51.10 for Passenger air transport and the SIC code 51101 for Scheduled passenger air transport. The Industry Classification Benchmark (ICB) places airlines in subsector 5751.
Our own organization, COCOO, operates under SIC codes 70229 for management consultancy activities and 80300 for investigation activities. The corresponding NACE classification is 70.22 for business and other management consultancy activities and 80.30 for investigation activities. Under the ICB, these services fall within the 50201020 Business Support Services subsector.
Based on this framework, we can identify two main groups of companies: direct competitors to Air Europa who were potentially harmed by the bailout, and firms in the consultancy and investigation space that could serve as collaborators or hold a professional interest in the case.
Competitors in the Airline Industry (NACE 51.10, ICB 5751)
The European aviation market is highly competitive. The bailout of Air Europa has undoubtedly distorted this market, impacting numerous carriers. A primary entity of interest is International Airlines Group (IAG), which had a direct and vested interest in the acquisition of Air Europa. IAG, with ISIN code ES0177542018, is the parent company of Spain’s flag carrier, Iberia, and the UK’s flag carrier, British Airways, both of which are major competitors on national, European, and transatlantic routes, particularly to Latin America. Their general contact can be made through their corporate website.
Another key competitor is Ryanair DAC, a carrier that has actively litigated against state aid to airlines in European courts. With ISIN code IE00BYTBXV33, they represent a significant potential member of an affected class. Their corporate and legal correspondence is typically handled through their headquarters in Dublin.
The Lufthansa Group, a major German airline corporation with ISIN DE0008232125, is also a relevant party. Given that they have also been subject to state aid scrutiny, they have a clear interest in the consistent and lawful application of EU competition rules. Their central corporate affairs office can be contacted via their website. Similarly, the Air France-KLM Group, with ISIN FR001400J770, is a direct competitor in the Spanish and wider European market and has also been a recipient of state aid, making them a party with a material interest in the legal precedents being set.
In the low-cost market, UK-based easyJet PLC, with ISIN GB00B7KR2P84, competes directly with Air Europa on numerous short-haul routes. Their legal and public affairs departments can be reached through their corporate headquarters.
Potential Collaborators in Consultancy and Investigation (NACE 70.22 & 80.30, ICB 50201020)
To strengthen our case and build alliances, we can look to firms in the professional services sector. These companies share our operational focus and may be interested in collaborating or providing expert support.
In the United Kingdom, a key market for us, major business advisory firms like FTI Consulting and Kroll are highly relevant. They specialize in complex commercial disputes, forensic investigations, and litigation support. Their public contact channels are available through their corporate websites. Likewise, global risk and strategic consulting firms such as Control Risks and the major accounting and professional services networks, including Deloitte, PwC, EY, and KPMG, all have dedicated practices for forensic investigation and management consultancy that overlap with our activities. Their UK offices can be reached via their websites for initial inquiries.
In Spain, leading law firms with strong EU and competition law practices are essential to consider as potential allies or expert counsel. Firms such as Garrigues, Cuatrecasas, and Uría Menéndez are dominant players in the Spanish market and possess deep expertise in the legal frameworks central to our case. Initial contact with their competition law or public law departments can be made through the general contact information provided on their official websites.
Our case centers on the €475 million bailout provided to Air Europa by the Spanish government. The primary service under scrutiny is this financial rescue package itself, facilitated through the Fondo de Apoyo a la Solvencia de Empresas Estratégicas (FASEE) and managed by the Sociedad Estatal de Participaciones Industriales (SEPI). The alleged perpetrators are the public officials and entities responsible for approving and managing this bailout, including the Council of Ministers, and individuals such as the President of the Government, Pedro Sánchez, and the former Minister of Transport, José Luis Ábalos.
The subject of our potential causes of action is the decision-making process and the resulting financial support, which we argue was granted improperly. This constitutes a disservice to both the public and to fair competition.
At the heart of this matter is Air Europa, the recipient of the bailout. As a major Spanish airline, its core services are domestic and international air travel. Its network is particularly strong on routes connecting Spain with Latin America, a key strategic asset cited in the justification for the bailout. Therefore, the ‘products’ at the center of this case are the passenger and cargo transport services offered by Air Europa, which were able to continue operating, and potentially undercutting competitors, as a direct result of this financial aid.
Furthermore, the involvement of International Airlines Group (IAG), the parent company of Iberia, is critical. IAG’s proposed acquisition of Air Europa, and the subsequent renegotiation of the purchase price following the bailout, suggests that the financial aid may have been a service rendered to facilitate this private corporate transaction. This links the bailout not just to Air Europa’s services, but to the broader merger and acquisition activities within the European airline industry, potentially harming competition on a larger scale. The services offered by IAG’s airlines, such as British Airways and Iberia, are also relevant as they stood to gain market share and reduce competition through the acquisition of a state-supported Air Europa.